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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. KLEIN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

Case No. 13994

vs.
MARY AVALON KLEIN,
Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF

OF

A P P E L L A N T

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Judgment incorporating the terms
of a purported stipulation of the parties to a modification of the
economic aspects of a previously entered decree of divorce.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
The original decree of divorce in this matter, in its
final amended form, was entered on November 22, 1972. On July 5, 1973,
this Court denied Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and affirmed
the judgment below.
(1973),

Klein v. Klein, 30 Utah 2d.l, 511 P.2d 1284

Thereafter the Defendant petitioned the trial court to invoke

the limited jurisdiction reserved in the original decree for the
purpose of modifying that decree.

The trial court subsequently

ordered a hearing of matters relating to the economic aspects of
the original decree for the purpose of determining whether there
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

were grounds for invoking
thatOCR,
decree's
reserved jurisdiction.
Machine-generated
may contain errors.

From said Order, the Plaintiff took an interlocutory
appeal to this Court, which appeal this Court declined to hear on
February 11, 1974.
The hearing with respect to economic matters took place on
July 23, 26 and 29, 1974, resulting in a Judgment, dated November
11, 1974 modifying the original decree of divorce, by revaluing the
marital estate and redividing the marital property.

On December

6, 1974, the hearings on the Plaintiff?s various motions for relief
from the Judgment of November 11, 1974, were commenced.

Those hearings

were suspended on December 9, 1974 by an alleged stipulation of the
parties to modify the original decree of divorce. A timely motion
by the Plaintiff to rescind the alleged stipulation was made and
denied and, on December 18, 1974, a Judgment was entered incorporating the terms of the alleged stipulation.
On December 27, 1974, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to set
aside the Judgment of December 18, 1974 and, in the alternative
a Motion for a New Trial.
28, 1975.

Those motions were denied on January

On February 14, 1975, the Plaintiff filed his Notice of

Appeal to this Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the consent Judgment of December 18, 1974, set aside as having been entered without his consent.

The Plaintiff requests that this Court make an

equitable modification of the original divorce decree or, in the
alternative, the Plaintiff requests that certain instructions from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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this Court to the trial court accompany any remand for further
determinations by the trial court in this matter.

The Plaintiff

also seeks a new trial.
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
This action is one of potentially great impact upon
the divorce law of this jurisdiction, presenting several crucial
questions of first impression.

It involves a trial court's

exercise of limited jurisdiction reserved in an earlier trial
court divorce decree in such a way as to overrule both an opinion
of this Court and a ruling of a court of equal jurisdiction.

The

Defendant has asked and received a trial de novo from the District
Court after having a denial of a Motion for New Trial affirmed on
appeal.
This action involves a pair of trial court judgments
revaluing an estate at eight times the value found two years earlier
in the original divorce decree.

Those judgments adopt asset values

that deviate not the slightest from those asserted by the Defendant
despite a gross disparity in the evidence.

Those judgments impose

financial obligations upon the Plaintiff in excess of his income;
they award to the Defendant marital assets which did not exist at
the time of the original decree, which the Defendant refused to
help acquire, and which in significant part were acquired with
assets of the Plaintiff's mother; they perpetuate a business partnership where the marital partnership has been dissolved; they force

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the almost certain liquidation of a potentially very valuable estate
at a fraction of its potential worth; and finally they deprive
the Plaintiff of his ability to practice his trade.
This action was initially filed in the District Court
for Salt Lake County in 1972. A Memorandum Decision was rendered
in May of that year after both sides were fully heard and all issues
were fully litigated.

After hearing Defendant's motions to amend

the Findings and Judgment, the court entered its Amended Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce in November of
that year.

On July 5, 1973, the Supreme Court of the State of

Utah denied Defendant's Motion for a New Trial and affirmed the
judgment below.

(Decision No. 13146.)

The Court noted that limited

recourse was available to Defendant under the trial court's reservation of "limited j urisdictionff to modify its decree:
"If within one year either party proves
to be suffering from serious financial distress
because of the decree to be~based on this decision
and the ensuing developments arising therefrom
not capable of evaluation at this time,..."
(Emphasis added, Memorandum Decision, page 99 of
the official record, hereinafter referred to as
Record, at 100, page 27 of the abstracted record,
hereinafter referred to as Abstract, at page 27).
Thereafter, the Defendant filed a Petition for Review of
Economic Matters and Modification of the Decree, asking the Court
to invoke the above-quoted limited jurisdiction reserved in the
original decree and to order the recalculation of the net worth of
the marital estate as of the date of the divorce decree.

-4-
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As a

basis for such jurisdiction, the Defendant offered an affidavit
dated November 8, 1973, which asserted that her former standard of
living and her current expenses exceeded her current income, as
evidence that she was suffering "serious financial distress"
within the meaning of the reservation.

The Plaintiff submitted a

counter-affidavit dated November 27, 1973 exposing the non-factual
nature of the Defendant's assertions as to her former standard
of living and her current expenses by disclosing his adjusted gross
income, as set forth in his recent income tax returns, and by disclosing the Defendant's actual debts, as set forth in the records
of her creditors.
On December 7, 1974, the court issued an Order Relating
to Review of Economic Matters affording both parties an "unrestricted" opportunity to present to the Court evidence bearing upon
all economic matters arising and/or resulting from the marriage of
the parties for the stated purpose of redividing the marital estate.
The Order makes no reference to changed circumstances such as would
serve as a basis for a modification proceeding under Section 30-3-5,
Utah Code Ann. (1953).

(Emphasis added).

Instead, it predicates

its grant of jurisdiction to modify the original decree upon
the reservation of limited jurisdiction in the original decree.
The Plaintiff took an interlocutory appeal from the Order
of December 7, 1974 asserting that the limited jurisdiction
reserved in the original decree had been exceeded.
declined to hear that appeal on February 11, 1974.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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This Court

The hearing with respect to economic matters took place
on July 23, 26 and 29, 1974, resulting in Findings, Conclusions
and a Judgment dated November 11, 1974.

Thereafter, on November

11, 1974, the trial court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Judgment, increasing the valuation of the marital estate
eight fold over that found in the original decree and six fold
over the amount ever attributed to the marital estate by a certified
public accountant or mortgage lending institution and, without
considering the financial distress of the Plaintiff, directed an
arbitrary and sweeping redistribution of the marital estate.
On November 14, 1974, the Plaintiff filed his Objections
to the November 11 Findings, Conclusions and Judgment and on
November 15, 1974, he filed a Motion for a New Trial or in the
Alternative, Motion to Take Additional Testimony and Evidence.
Hearing of the above motions began on December 6, 1974.
On Monday, December 9, the hearing was resumed and an
unusual sequence of events ensued.

On that day, prior to the

noon recess, the Defendant's counsel made an offer of settlement
to the Plaintiff's counsel.

The Plaintiff's counsel related

some of the terms of the offer to the Plaintiff and advised him
to accept them.

The Plaintiff instructed his counsel to continue

negotiations, believing that whatever proposal his counsel was
ultimately able to obtain from the Defendant would be developed
in detail, reduced to written form, and submitted to both parties
for their final approval.
-6-
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Following the noon recess, and before the Plaintiff's
motions had been fully heard, formal court procedure was suspended.
In the court's presence, the Defendant's attorneys orally proposed terms of settlement, in part by proposing individual settlement terms, but chiefly by referring to numbers of paragraphs of
the November 11, 1974 Judgment, a judgment which the Plaintiff
had never been advised existed, which he had never seen, and which,
when presented to him orally in the form of paragraph numbers alone,
he could not comprehend.
The sudden abandonment of formal court procedure had not
been explained to the Plaintiff and was bewildering to him.

The

oral proposal of settlement terms by paragraph numbers of a judgment of which he was not aware added to his bewilderment.

At the

insistence of his counsel, the Plaintiff believed that his concurrence in the proceedings at this point was necessary for the
negotiation process to go forward.
The Plaintiff's shaken, dejected and disoriented mental
state at the time of the above described oral proceedings is
documented in the transcript of the Proceedings of December 9th,
the Plaintiff's Affidavit, dated January 17", 1975, the Affidavit
of the Appellant, dated March 11, 1975 and confirmed by the Affidavit of Stephen R. Anderson, Vice President of Valley Bank § Trust,
dated February 24, 1975, with whom the Plaintiff talked shortly
after these proceedings were concluded.

-7-

The latter two documents

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

are items (h) and (i) respectively submitted with the Plaintiff*s
Rule 75 Memorandum of Authorities, dated March 17, 1975 on file
with this Court.

That the Plaintiff's incapacity under the

circumstances to intelligently give his acceptance to a settlement
agreement only a few of the terms of which he was actually
apprised, is apparent from the following interchange recorded
at page 10, lines 9 through 12 of the hearing transcript:
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Klein, you have
heard your counsel read into the record, part of it
by reference to paragraphs. I donft know whether
you have been able to follow it or not.
MR. KLEIN: I haven't followed it, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand it?
MR. KLEIN: I am relying on my counsel. At
this point, I haven't been able to read it.
Though the transcript later shows the Plaintiff to have
replied affirmatively when asked by the Court if he understood
and accepted the stipulation, the Plaintiff had no opportunity
in the interim to read the contents of the stipulation.

This

subsequent interchange, therefore, did nothing to alter the true
nature of the Plaintiff's Mconsent,M and render it intelligently o
voluntarily given.
The first time that the Plaintiff had the capacity to
comprehend the effect of his oral stipulation was the following
day, in St. George, Utah, after he had recovered his emotional
equilibrium.

He immediately tried to consult his attorney

in Salt Lake City, but was unsuccessful.

On Wednesday, the

11th of December, the terms and the effect of the stipulation
were first comprehended by the Plaintiff as a result of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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conversation with his counsel.

It was clear to the Plaintiff that

numerous terms of the stipulation of which he had not been informed,
made his compliance impossible, regardles-s of his good faith.

For

this reason, the Plaintiff informed his counsel that the stipulation could not be agreed to.
The Plaintiff telephoned his counsel on December 12, asking
to see the written stipulation and was informed that it had already
been signed by his counsel earlier that day.

On December 13, the

Plaintiff was informed by his counsel that because he had already
signed the stipulation, he believed that, as an officer of the court,
he was unable to challenge it.

He, therefore, advised the Plaintiff

that as a legal matter, the stipulation could only be challenged by
a new attorney.
In order to allow the Plaintiff to apply for a rescission
of his stipulation, his counsel made a motion to withdraw on December
17,

The court, however, required counsel to sign the stipulated

Judgment as a condition to permitting him to withdraw.

(Proceedings

of December 18, 1974, at page 2, lines 6-11, 386 Abstract at 386).
On the afternoon of the 17th, the Plaintiff informed the court of his
desire to rescind the stipulation, to which the court did not respond
other than to advise him to deal through new counsel.

Later that

same day, prior to Judge Taylor's signing of the judgment and decree
based upon the wirtten stipulation, Plaintiff's attorney, James R.
Brown, in the presence of Defendant's attorney, James P. Cowley,
presented the motion to rescind the stipulation without argument.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mr. Brown explained that his client, Mr. Klein, had specifically
stated that he did not wish Mr. Brown to sign the stipulation.
Mr. Cowley explained that he would submit the stipulation to the
court only if ordered to do so.

Thereupon, Judge Taylor denied the

motion to rescind the stipulation and ordered that the document be
received and made part of the file.

(Transcript of hearing of

Proceedings of December 18, 1974, at page 2, 386 Abstract at 387-88).
On December 18, 1974, a Judgment modifying the original
Judgment and Decree of November 22, 1972, was entered by the
court, based on Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
November 11, 1974 and incorporating by reference the purported
stipulation of the parties, signed December 12, 1974.
On December 27, 1974, the Plaintiff filed a Motion to
set aside the Judgment of December 18, 1974, and a Motion for a
New Trial.-

Those Motions were denied on January 28, 1975 and on

February 14, 1975, the Plaintiff filed his Notice of Appeal to this
Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1974 INCORPORATING THE
OF THE PLAINTIFF IS INVALID AND NoN^BlNDING.

PURP0RTED~STTPULATIQN

It is the clear majority rule that in order for a judgment based on a stipulation of the parties to be valid and binding,
actual consent to a stipulated judgment must exist at the very
moment the court undertakes to make the stipulation the judgment

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

of the court.

For a summary of the majority rule, see 47 Am.

Jur.2d "Judgments", Sec. 1083.

The majority rule is stated

in Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar, 249 Iowa 504, 87 N.W.2d
311 (1958).

There it was held that the court has no authority

to enter a consent judgment where, to the knowledge of the Court,
a party to the settlement agreement refuses to be bound thereby.
It further held that entry of a consent judgment under such
circumstances constitutes an irregularity of the court, justifying
a new trial.

Plaintiff in the present case has a right to a

new trial identical to that enunciated in Van Donselaar.

The

trial court clearly abused its discretion by denying the Plaintiff
that right.

Van Donselaar cites in support of the majority rule

Burnaman v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333, 240 S.W.2d 288, 291 (1951),
rehearing denied:
A valid consent judgment cannot be rendered
by a court when the consent of one of the parties
thereto is wanting. It is not sufficient to support
the judgment that the party's consent thereto may at one
time havebeen given; consent must exist at the very
moment the court undertakes to make the agreement
the judgment of "the court". (Emphasis added).
The majority view is confirmed in Rodriguez v. Rodriguez
224 N.C. 225, 29 S.E.2d 901, 905; Williamson v. Williamson,
224 N.C. 474, 31 S.E.2d 367, 368; King v. King, 225 N.C. 639,
35 S.E.2d 893; Lee v. Rhodes, 227 N.C. 373, 41 S.E.2d 747,
748; Ledford v. Ledford, 229 N.C. 373, 49 S.E.2d 794, 796;
Jacobs v. Steinbrink, 242 App. Div. 197, 273 N.Y.S. 498, 507;
In re Thompsons Adoption, 178 Kan. 127, 283 P.2d 493, 498;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MacArthur v. Thompson, 140 Neb. 408, 299 N.W. 519, 523, 524;
130 A.L.R. 413, 419.
It should be noted that no issue of the sanctity of
judgments is presented by the facts of this case, since the
court was notified of the Plaintiff's withdrawal of consent prior
to the entry of judgment.
The alleged stipulation entered into by the Plaintiff
has no force or effect by virtue of the signing of the written
stipulation by the Plaintiff's former attorney, Mr. James R. Brown,
since Mr. Brown did not have the authority to endorse the stipulation at the time of signing.
this.

Counsel for both parties conceded

(Transcript of Proceedings of December 18, 1974, at page 2,

386 Abstract 388.)
If the purported stipulation entered into by the Plaintiff
has any legal effect, it is as an oral contract alone, formed
during the hearing of December 9, 1974.
The legal standard governing the granting of relief from
stipulations intended to serve as the basis of judgments is basically
the same as that governing the granting of equitable relief from
an ordinary contract.

161 A.L.R. 1160, 1192.

Grounds found by the

courts to support rescission of a contract in equity include
mistake of fact or law, fraud, duress, undue influence, excusable
neglect and incapacity.

161 A.L.R. 1160, 1171. The special con-

siderations applied by the courts to the rescission of stipulations entered during the trial process is that the request for

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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withdrawal must be timely, such relief must be necessary to
prevent injustice to the party seeking it, and the adverse party
should not be placed at a disadvantage by having acted in compliance
with the stipulation entered into.

Sinnock v. Young, 61 Cal. App.2d

130, 142 P.2d 85 (1943), 161 A.L.R. 1160, 1169, 1171.
These standards are applied with particular leniency in
this jurisdiction in the context of divorce proceedings. Mathie
v. Mathie, 12 Utah 2d 116, 363 P.2d 779 (1961) states the general
principle governing the degree to which private contractual arrangements in divorce actions are entitled the deference of the court.
It held that:
The marriage itself and the obligations
inherent in it are matters which it has always
been recognized cannot be left entirely to
private contract. This applies also to the
property rights of the parties because their
welfare, and to some degree the public welfare
is involved.... Under it (Sec. 30-3-5, Utah
Code Ann.) there can be no doubt of the
court's prerogative to make whatever disposition of the property, including the rights
in such (property settlement contract, as
it deems fair, equitable and just. 363 P.2d
at 784.
Specifically, the rule in Utah is that in a divorce action,
the trial court should make such provision for alimony as the
present circumstances warrant, and any stipulation of the parties
in respect thereto serves only as a recommendation to the court.
Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 265, 139 P.2d 222 (1943), following
Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 111 P.2d 792 (1941),
and citing note in 109 A.L.R. 1068. Rule followed in Madsen
y. Madsen, 2 Utah 2d 423, 267 P.2d 917 (1954), Openshaw v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Openshaw, 102 Utah 22, 126 P.2d 1068 (1942), Callister v. Callister,
1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 (1953).

The rule applies equally

to modifications of divorce decrees. Hall v. Hall, 111 Utah
263, 177 P.2d 731 (1947).
The policy of the Utah courts is clearly to defer less
to private stipulations in divorce matters than to private stipulations
outside of the divorce context.

This policy is reflected in

Rule 52(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that
except in actions for divorce parties may waive findings of fact
and conclusions of law in writing or in open court. (Emphasis
added).

In Utah, and generally, the showing necessary to rescind

a marital property settlement is, therefore, clearly a lesser
showing than that required to rescind an ordinary contract in
equity, the normal standard for rescinding a settlement agreement.
This Plaintiff satisfies the prerequisites for rescinding
his settlement agreement under the general standard governing the
rescission of contracts in equity or the specific standard governing
the rescission of settlement contracts in the context of divorce.

His

application to rescind the stipulation was made within one week
after it occurred.

There is no evidence that the Defendant had

detrimentally relied upon the existence of the stipulation.
Indeed, she had little opportunity to do so in view of the Plaintiff's
almost immediate application for equitable rescission.

While

allowing the Plaintiff to rescind his stipulation would not have
prejudiced the Defendant, to bind the Plaintiff to the stipulation
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would be manifestly unjust.

A further consequence of binding

the Plaintiff to the stipulation would be manifest injustice
to third parties, inviting a spate of third party lawsuits. These
two latter points will be fully developed later in the Plaintiff's
argument.
Under the circumstances surrounding the Plaintiff1s purported stipulation, he lacked the capacity to contract.

Those

circumstances show the following:
1)

The Plaintiff was justifiably ignorant of the bulk

of the terms of the proposed settlement.
The Plaintiff first heard most of the terms of the proposed
settlement during informal court proceedings when the Defendants
counsel announced them orally in the form of numbers to paragraphs
of the Judgment of November 11, 1974 which Judgment the Plaintiff
had never seen and had never been advised existed.

Therefore, he

could not fully comprehend the nature of the settlement proposed
nor evaluate its impact on his exceedingly complex personal
estate.

The Plaintiff1s ignorance of the bulk of the terms of

the proposed settlement and his resulting inability to comprehend
it is reflected in the Transcript of the Proceedings of December
9 and 18, 1974 at page 10, lines 9 through 12, 372 Abstract at 381:
THE COURT; All right. Mr. Klein, you
have heard your counsel read into the record, part of
it by reference to paragraphs. I don't know
whether you have been able to follow it or not.
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MR. KLEIN;
Honor.
THE COURT:

I haven1t followed it, Your
Do you understand it?

MR. KLEIN; I am relying on my counsel. At
this point, I haven't been able to read it.
Though the Plaintiff subsequently stated his acceptance
of the stipulation, this does not reflect a valid acceptance
intelligently given, since the Plaintiff never did have the opportunity to read the full terms of the proposed settlement.
2)

The Plaintiff labored under a fundamental misconception

as to the nature of the stipulation proceedings and the legal
effect of his oral assent.
The Plaintiff, when advised in very general terms of the Defendant's
proposed settlement, instructed his counsel to continue negotiations,
believing that whatever terms his counsel was ultimately able
to obtain would be reduced to writing and submitted to him for
his final approval and signature.

This mistake on the part of

the Plaintiff was justified under the circumstances.
is a layman.

The Plaintiff

The stipulation proceedings and their legal effect

were not explained to him; he had to interpret them for himself.
The Plaintiff knew that the court and counsel for both sides
were aware of his ignorance of many of the proposal's terms,
as the passage from the transcript quoted above demonstrates.
The Plaintiff made the assumption that a marital estate as complex
as his would not be finally disposed of by a court in such an
informal, ad hoc manner.

Finally, the Plaintiff believed that

following the informal proceedings, which were new and confusing
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to him, formal court proceedings would be resumed, at which time
a detailed settlement would be formally proposed.

When asked

for his assent to specific settlement terms by the opposing
counsel, the Plaintiff believed, reasonably under the circumstances, that an assent in principle was being sought from him
so that the negotiation process might proceed to its final stage.
That the Plaintiff's interpretation of the settlement proceedings
was mistaken is not surprising nor was it unjustified.
3)

The Plaintiff's mental condition at the time his

oral assent to the settlement agreement was given was such as
to seriously impair his ability to comprehend the nature of the
Defendant's offer.
The Plaintiff, during the proceedings of December 9, 1974, was
exhausted and emotionally drained by the taxing demands of
keeping a large complex of speculative real estate holdings alive
on a shoestring of liquid assets while such assets were under
the constant cloud of divorce and modification proceedings.
Over the noon hour the Plaintiff was shaken and dejected by his
counsel's assessment of the predisposition of the court toward
his case.
The informal stipulation procedure was new and confusing
to the Plaintiff and much of its stipulation's content, presented
orally by paragraph number alone, could not be determined by
him.

This confusion, fatigue, and depression combined to produce

in the Plaintiff an extremely disorientated mental state at the
time of his oral acceptance.
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The foregoing facts demonstrate defects in the Plaintifffs
capacity to intelligently and voluntarily contract under the
circumstances, which defects are sufficient to set aside a contract in equity.
It is submitted that the Plaintiff's defective acceptance,
his timely application for rescission and his timely withdrawal
of his consent to a stipulated judgment render the Judgment of
December 18, 1974 null and void under the strong majority view
expressed in Van Donselaar, supra.

Parenthetically, it should be

noted that the sanctity of property settlement agreements is
founded upon concern for prejudice to the opposing party and
to some extent upon a concern for the stability of title to real
property.

Where, as here, the request for rescission is almost

immediate, having been made prior to any detrimental reliance
by the opposing party and prior to the entry of judgment, and
the request is made for good cause shown, the policy underlying
the sanctity of property settlement agreements does not apply
and may not properly serve as a bar to rescission.
POINT II
THE JUDGMENTS OF NOVEMBER 11 AND DECEMBER 18, 1974 WERE MANIFESTLY' INEQUITABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF.
The Judgment of November 11, 1974, was merged into the
Judgment of December 18, 1974, and extinguished.

Myers v. Southard,

110 S.W.2d 1185 CTex. 1937), Price v. First NatTl Bank, 62 Kan.
735, 64P. 637, Garvin v. Garvin, 27 S.C. 472, 4 S.E. 148, Gould
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v. Hayden, 63 Ind. 443, Bertram v, Waterman, 18 Iowa 529, Denegre
v, Haun, 13 Iowa 240. Accepting the position that the Judgment
of December 18, is void, there is no final disposition of this
case before the court, if a technical view of the posture of
this case is taken.

Should the posture of this case be considered

interlocutory at this time, the Plaintiff submits that the denial
of review at this stage would extend the cloud of litigation
over the marital estate into its fourth year, and that such circumstances constitute hardship to both parties justifying appellate
review at this time.

Under the rule of Schurtz v. Thorley, 90

Utah 381, 61 P.2d 1262. Q.936).
The first issue which the Plaintiff seeks to raise is the
inequity of the modifications of the original divorce decree heretofore entered by the trial court.

It seeks such review for the pur-

pose of requesting this Court to undertake to make an equitable division of the marital estate or, in the alternative, to remand this
action to the trial court together with certain instructions
as to what constitutes an equitable division of the marital
estate.
To determine whether the trial court!s modifications of
the original decree thus far have been inequitable, it is first
necessary to discuss the legal standard that governs this Courtfs
determinations of the issue of inequity and issues of fact when
sitting in equity to review an award of marital property.

1
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The role of an appellate court in this jurisdiction
sitting in review of awards of alimony or marital property
has been the subject of numerous opinions of this Court.

Dahlberg

v. Dahlberg, 11 Utah 157, 292 P.214 (1930), is a leading opinion
addressing this issue.

There the plaintiff wife appealed the

portion of the jnarital property awarded to her, alleging that
she was entitled to a larger share of the marital estate since
her joint efforts had contributed to the acquisition of the entire
estate.

The husband defendant argued that the trial court's

award must be affirmed on appeal unless there was a showing of
"a gross abuse of discretion or that the allowance was 'grossly
excessive or grossly inadequate'".

The court rejected the standard

of review asserted by the defendant and held at 61 P.2d 216-17:
Such stated rule is disputed by the Plaintiff,
who urges that the kind of division or the amount of
an allowance to be made is dependent upon the facts,
circumstances, and conditions of -each particular case,
and, if s upon a consideration of them, the division or allow* ' a n c e ~& made by the court below is inequitable or unjust,
this court is justified, and it is its duty to interfere ,"~and that, to do so, it is not essential to show
j^J^" a.buse of discretion in the court below, that it is"
enough," iF~upon the record presented the court below
erred in making the division or allowance and that
equity and justice require an interference and~~a
modification thereof, (Citations omitted).'"
(1,2) We think the rule contended for by the
plaintiff is the correct rule, and is in line with
the later cases from this jurisdiction.
'(3) Thfe question' thus is as to whether on the
facts found the division and allowance were equitable
and just. As to that, a divorce proceeding being an
action in equity, the parties, under our Cons titjtj^on,
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are entitled to our judgment, as well as that of
the trial courtT (Citations omitted). (Emphasis
added),
~
Under this standard of review, Dahlberg held that the
trial court had abused its discretion in failing to award the
wife a larger share of the martial property and directed the
trial court to increase the alimony awarded to the wife.
The dissenting opinion in Dahlberg argued that the proper
standard of review was somewhat more strict to determine whether
the award of the trial court was

ft

clearly unjust or inequitable.M

61 P.2d at 218,
Also at issue in Dahlberg was the applicable legal standard
for reviewing issues of fact when this Court sits in equity to examine
awards of marital property in actions for divorce.

It approves

the following holding from Jensen v. Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282,
p, 1034, 1037 (1929) at 217:
In the case last cited, we said: "This case
is one in equity. In this jurisdiction the MndTng
effect of findings of the trial court in law^cas"es^"
is different from that in equity' cases. ... lii the"
latter, our duty and responsibility in approving
or disaproving findings when challenged are moFe
comprehensiveV In such case, on an appearand a
review on questions of both law and fact, and "cm
a^challenge of findings, the review in effect is
a triar^de novo on the record....
The statement of the rule as there made is
but a restatement of it asfrequently announced in
the prior cTted cases and~as it in other cases
often was applied in reviewing and considering
fact findings in equity cases without any express
sTa'tement of tlTe" rule. (Emphasis addecf) .
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Having established the appropriate standard of review applicable both to the issue of equity and to issues of fact with respect
to marital property awards it becomes necessary to apply that standard
to the facts of this case.
In its Judgments of November 11, and December 18, 1974,
the trial court has modified the original decree of divorce in this
case in such a way as to cause the almost certain collapse and
liquidation of the marital estate at a fraction of its potential
value.

It has done so by dividing the marital property by a routine

division in kind, awarding roughly half of the assets to the Plaintiff and half to the Defendant.

This manner of dividing a

marital estate may be well suited to the usual marital estate
in which the breadwinnerfs salary is the most significant asset
and the property divided in kind is merely personal property
of the parties.

But the consequences of imposing a division

in kind upon this highly unusual marital estate are disasterous.
To understand this point requires a brief explanation of the
nature of this marital estate.
The Plaintiff has considerable skill and expertise in
the business of real estate development and during the marriage
has brought substantial assets into the marital estate.

The

principal assets brought into the estate by the Plaintiff consist
of Major Enterprises, Inc., Award Homes, Inc. and Dynamic, Inc.,
ac complex of corporations designed to acquire and develop real
estate.

It was founded by the Plaintiff who owns fifty percent
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(50%) of the stock of the component corporations.

The apartments

held by this complex, together with the home of the parties,
represent the hard assets of the marital estate, being income
producing or reasonably marketable.

The salary received by the

Plaintiff as an officer of these corporations represents his
sole source of income and the only source of funds by which the
Plaintiff can service the enormous purchase money debt he has
incurred to assemble a large complex of speculative real estate
holdings.

The other principal assets of the marital estate

consist of those speculative real estate holdings—the "Pershing
Nelson/1 "Sandberg" and "Seegmiller" properties.

The adjacent

"Pershing Nelson" and "Sandberg" properties together constitute
420 acres of raw, arid, sagebrush covered desert roughly three
miles from the developed portion of St. George, Utah.

The

"Seegmiller" property consists of 1181 acres of raw desert land,
roughly the size of St. George proper, situated on a high arid
plateau, approximately 4-1/2 miles from the City of St. George
and accessible from that city by a switchback dirt road.
The present values of these parcels of raw land is iiichoate
and extremely speculative.

Their potential worth as developed

land is substantial but the chance that such potential will be
realized is highly uncertain.

The Nelson/Sandberg and the Seegmiller

lands are approximately of half, and of equal size, respectively,
to the present city of St. George.

They are situated at a consider-

able distance from existing development and are without access
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to water, utilities and urban services.

These parcels can be suc-

cessfully developed only as single, large self-sufficient communities.

The relevant market is a speculative wholesale real

estate market as the Defendant's expert witness concedes.

The

wholesale real estate market in the St. George area is a poorly
defined, disorganized, boom and bust market.

This is due in part

to the presence of several other extraordinarily large parcels
of developable land near St. George not owned by the Plaintiff
that are sufficient to saturate the entire wholesale real estate
market of that area.

The

f,

marketn for large, isolated tracts

of desert land is the opposite of that for a standardized good,
sold on an organized, well-defined market.

Offers to purchase

these parcels at their potential developable values are few, if
any, and far between.

Their "market value11 is largely hypothetical,

depending far more on the skill, timing and promotional talent
of the individual promoter than on any consideration of supply
and demand.

As the checkered history of the various Bloomington

projects show, large-scale development projects in the St. George
area are an enormous gamble; they either catch on or die. Therefore, whether the developed values of these two parcels will ever
be realized depends essentially on the promotional skills and
the development expertise of the Plaintiff, not upon an abstract
and largely hypothetical market value.
The original decree of divorce, dated November 22, 1972,
valued the marital estate at $225,000.00 and divided this amount
in approximately equal portions between the parties, the Defendant's
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

share consisting largely of the parties home and certain liquidated
stock*

Following the modification proceedings of July, 1974,

the trial court made a spectacular revaluation of the marital
estate arriving at a net worth of $1,748,809,98, as compared to
the net worth of $225,090.00 contained in the original decree.
In paragraph 8 of its Findings of Fact, dated November 11, 1974,
the principal assets of the marital estate were valued as follows:
Plaintiff1s
Valuation
Stock in Major Enterprises,
Inc. Principal holdings are
apartment complexes, some
raw land
Stock in Holidair Lands,
Inc. Principal holdings
are raw land and contingent
rights to raw land
Contract receivable from
Holidair Lands, Inc.
Seegmiller lands. Large
tract of raw land in vicinity of St. George, Utah

Defendant's
Valuation

Findings of the
Court Nov., 1974

95,000

543,000

543,000

negative

196,762

196,762

390,000

504,000

504,000

59,000

416,000

416,000

O.K. Enterprises -Principal holdings are apartments, one-half of which
the Plaintiff doesnft own,
and some raw land

33,250

141,050

141,050

Total Marital Estate assets

503,469

2,043,912

2,037,535

Total Marital Estate
liabilities

191,089

114,350

288,725

Net worth, Marital estate

312,380

1,929,562
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1,748,809

The trial court, in its Findings, dated November 11, 1974, thus
resolved the dispute as to asset values entirely in favor of the
Defendant.
In both its Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of November
11 and its Judgment of December 18, 1974, the trial court divided
the marital assets in roughly equal portions between the parties, but
awarded a substantial beneficial interest in the speculative properties without equivalent debt and risk to the Defendant.
The division of assets decreed in the lower court's Judgments of November 11, and December 18, 1974 are summarized and compared in Appendix A of the Plaintiff's brief.
In determining whether the divisions of property decreed
in the Judgments of November 11, and December 18, 1974 have been
inequitable, this Court must pass upon three issues.

First, whether

these divisions of property are likely to preserve the assets of
the marital estate and encourage their continued growth and their
ultimate liquidation for the benefit of both parties at their developed
values.

This determination of fact is to be made upon appeal

according to the fair preponderance of the evidence.

Jensen v.

Howell, 75 Utah 64, 282 P.1034,1036 (1929).
Second, if this Court finds, by the fair preponderance
of the evidence, that the marital assets are not likely to be
preserved for the benefit of the parties by those divisions of
property, then this Court must determine whether the forced
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liquidation of the marital estate at this stage of its development
is inequitable or unjust to one or both of the parties. A third
and related issue which this Court must pass upon in order to
determine whether the divisions of property made by the court
below are inequitable or unjust, is whether the Plaintiff would
thereby be prevented from the practice of his profession and
whether such prevention would be unjust.
Will the property divisions decreed thus far by the trial
court force the premature liquidation of the marital estate?
To make this determination, the marital estate must be analyzed
from the viewpoint of liquidity and the probability that its
liquidity needs will be satisfied under the divisions of property
decreed by the trial court.
A simplified analysis of the marital property reveals
that the total net worth of roughly $1,800,000 as found in the
paragraph 8 of the Findings of November 11, 1974 (377 Record 379-80,
306 Abstract at 309), consists of the home of the parties, valued
at $100,000, fifty percent (50%) ownership of the stock of Major
Enterprises, revalued by the trial court at roughly $550,000
according to the value of the underlying apartments and land
held by that corporation, fifty percent (50%) ownership of the
St. George Sandpiper apartment complex, valued at roughly $70,000,
the Seegmiller property, valued at roughly $400,000 and the
eighty-two percent (82%) interest in the stock of Holidair Lands,
a real estate holding company whose assets consist solely of
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contract rights to purchase the Pershing Nelson and Sandberg
lands, valued at roughly $200,000, and a contract receivable
from Holidair Lands valued roughly at $500,000.
Defining liquid assets as those that will yield current
income or are readily marketable at their maximum value, few
of the marital assets can be considered liquid.

As previously

discussed, the Nelson/Sandberg and Seegmiller properties, if
disposed of immediately in the St. George area's wholesale real
estate market, would bring but a small fraction of their maximum
potential value.

The contract receivable from Holidair Lands,

if disposed of today in the contract receivables market at a
competitive price, would bring less than one-third of its value
at maturity.

CPlaintiff!s Memorandum, 319 Record at 328, 267

Abstract at 280). The fifty percent (50%) stock interest in
Major Enterprises has no market value, representing a non-controlling blockof restricted stock in a close corporation.

By

the Defendant's admission, such stock has as its only potential
buyer the owner of the other fifty percent (50%) of the stock.
That buyer has overcommitted all available personal and corporate
funds to finance a large construction project and is financially
incapable of purchasing the stock.

Major Enterprises itself

has experienced net operating losses,since 1974 and faces a
current cash shortage of between $250,000 and $400,000 and,
therefore, has no prospect of paying dividends.

(Testimony of

Verl O'Brien, 1350 Record at 1568-72, Affidavit of Verl O'Brien,
dated November 15, 1974, 422 Record at 422-24, 352 Abstract at
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The residence of the Plaintiff, though perhaps readily
marketable, is not realistically available to the estate as a
liquid asset because of the Defendants view that it is indispensable to her life style and must be retained.

As a source of

liquid funds, this leaves the parties fifty percent (50%) interest
in the Sandpiper apartment complex and 3 acres of contiguous
land.

These apartments could be renovated to yield a net rental

income to the estate of $200 per month.

It is possible that

$40,000, after taxes, could eventually be raised by a sale of
the contiguous 3 acres at the fair market price asserted by the
Defendant.
The only other source of liquid capital is the Plaintiff's
after tax salary of roughly $21,600 per year from the corporate
complex.

Thirteen Thousand Dollars ($13,000) is paid per year

to support the Defendant, $3,600 per year is used to support
the Plaintiff and his wife, leaving approximately $5,000 in
uncommitted salary per year available to retire the purchase
money debts of the marital estate's business assets and finance
their development.

If the rental income from the Sandpiper

apartments is added to that, there is available to this marital
estate a total of $7,400 per year to satisfy the financial requirements of its business assets.

This amount cannot even satisfy

the annual interest payments due on the business assets of the
estate.
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The financial demands of this estate1s business
assets are set forth in the Plaintiff's Memorandum (357 Record
at 372, 218 Abstract of 239-40) and in the Affidavit in Support of
Objections, dated November 14, 1974 (417 Record at 420, 343 Abstract
at 347), The amounts contained therein are taken directly from
the Plaintiff?s promissory notes received in evidence (255 Record
at 255-61) and are unchallenged by the Defendant.

Item 7D of

the Plaintiff!s Affidavit in Support of Objections (417 Record at
418, 343 Abstract at 346), discloses that interest on indebtedness
incurred to acquire the business assets of the marital estate
is accruing at the rate of roughly $950 per month or $11,500
per year.

The Plaintiff's Memorandum (357 Record at 372) dis-

closes approximately $145,000 of past due principal indebtedness
incurred to acquire the business assets of the marital estate.
Principal * indebtedness on purchase money obligations that will
come due by the first month of 1976 include installment payments
on business properties of approximately $85,000.

By that time,

the Plaintiff's matured business-related indebtedness will equal
approximately $230,000. The marital estate will require another
$50,000 to $75,000 in liquid funds as "seed moneyn to begin
development of the raw land within the marital estate in order
to set in motion the process by which liquid funds can be generated from an estate of this nature.
The liquid funds required in the immediate future to
prevent the premature liquidation of this marital estate at a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fraction of its potential value, are, therefore, approximately
$280,000 to $300,000. The only available liquid funds being
$7,200 per year plus, perhaps, $40,000 fr.om the sale of the land
contiguous to the St. George Sandpiper apartments, the rest must
be raised, if at all, by freeing the Seegmiller, Sandberg and
Pershing Nelson properties from the present judgment liens imposed
upon them so that the Plaintiff may employ them as collateral
for loans to retire the outstanding purchase money debt and to
use as seed money.
The Plaintiff has the proven talent and ability as a
real estate developer, the long experience with the real estate
market in the St. George area, and the ability to attract the
necessary investment funds to make large scale real estate development on the property of the marital estate succeed, if given
the opportunity.

Any such prospect of successfully preserving

and developing the marital assets will be foreclosed by the
divisions of property heretofore decreed by the trial court,
imposing, as they do, a routine division in kind upon the speculative assets of the estate, awarding the beneficial interest
therein to the Defendant outright, encumbering them with liens
in favor of the Defendant, and still requiring the Plaintiff,
without liquid funds and without the tools whereby liquid funds
might be raised, to discharge the purchase money debt.
The Plaintiff submits that a division of highly speculative and non-liquid marital property in kind is justified only
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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where it is required to meet urgent material needs of one of
the parties.

It cannot be maintained that the Defendant has

urgent material needs necessitating the liquidation of the marital
estate in such a manner.

The Defendant enjoys a $103,000 home,

a country club membership and an income of $1,505 per month
according to her own Affidavit, (213 Record at 213, 87 Abstract
at 88) to support a household of three, double the income on
which she supported a household of four prior to the divorce.
A comparison of the financial condition of the respective parties
taken from the Defendant's Affidavit of November 8, 1973 (213
Record, 87 Abstract), the Plaintiff's Memorandum (357 Record,
218 Abstract), and the Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Objections, dated November (417 Record, 343 Abstract) appears at
Appendix B.
A factor compounding the inequity of the property divisions
adopted thus far by the lower court, is the requirement contained
in paragraph 7D of the Conclusions of Law, and Judgment of November
11, 1974, (377 Record at392, 306 Abstract at 320), and in paragraph
5F of the Judgment of December 18, 1974, (443 Record at 448,
390 Abstract at 395), that the Plaintiff shall be required to
pledge his stock in Major Enterprises to the Court as security
for the payment of the mortgage on the Seegmiller property and
the payment of $50,000 in cash to the Defendant, with the provision that upon default, the stock is to be sold and the proceeds
applied to the unsatisfied obligation.

As previously noted,
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the Plaintiff's sole source of income is his salary from Major
Enterprises, plus small additional salaries from the other corporations in the corporate complex founded by him.
ownership protects that salary.

His stock

It was also noted previously

that this stock is a non-controlling block of restricted stock
in a closely held corporation, one

that has experienced operating

losses since 1974 and is currently suffering from a severe cash
deficit.

The remaining shareholder in Major Enterprises, who

the Defendant has admitted is the only possible buyer of the
Plaintiff's stock, has no uncommitted funds to purchase such
stock.

There being no market for the Plaintiff's Major Enterprises

stock, a forced sale by the Court would contribute very little
to paying any obligation secured by it.

The only significant

consequence of such a sale would be the loss of the Plaintiff's
interest in Major Enterprises, jeopardizing his salary and only
source of income.

It has been noted that both of the divisions

of property heretofore made by the trial court impose obligations
upon the Plaintiff in excess of his income, leave no collaterizable assets at his disposal, and, therefore, make highly likely
the Plaintiff's default and loss of his stock in Major Enterprises,
the corporation he founded.
There is an additional factor compounding the inequity
of the property divisions thus far decreed by the lower court.
Raw land has historically played a unique and indispensable role
in the Plaintiff's practice of his profession as a developer of
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large residential communities.

He has held raw land in the form

of options or low equity installment purchase contracts to serve
as inventory in the production of homes and condominiums.

At such

time as development became appropriate and the land was needed as
a component in the production of condominiums or subdivisions, it
was then fully acquired.

The land so acquired is unique.

Its

characteristics are as peculiarily suited to the requirements of
the Plaintiff in the practice of his profession as the tools of a
skilled craftsman are to his craft.

A developer of large residential

communities cannot practice his profession if he does not have at
his disposal raw land of the right size, location and topography.
To the Plaintiff such tracts of land are tools.

The loss of those

tools can prevent the practice of the Plaintiff's trade.

The

public policy of the bankruptcy laws to protect trademanfs tools
is a public policy equally applicable to the facts of this case.
This policy was basic to the trial court's reasoning in the original
divorce decree wherein it left the speculative assets of the
marital estate to the disposition of the Plaintiff, and retained
limited jurisdiction to be exercised in the event that the disposition
of those assets warranted an equitable modification of that decree.
^Findings, Conclusions and Judgment dated June 26, 1972,

163

Record at 170, 145 Abstract at 151).
The Plaintiff submits that under either the standard
of review established in Pahlberg or the more strict standard
advocated in the Dahlberg dissent, it clearly works an inequity
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and an injustice to both parties to reappraise a marital estate
at eight times the value placed upon it in the original trial
and at six times the value ever placed upon it as collateral
by lending institutions, to divide the speculative business assets
in kind, giving the beneficial interest in them to the Defendant and the debt obligations to the Plaintiff, to encumber the
business assets and nullify their value as collateral and to
thereby force the premature liquidation of the estate at a fraction of its potential developed value because the manner of
dividing the estate has left no way by which the estatefs obligations can be met.
As noted, the Defendant does not have urgent material
needs requiring a division of the marital property in kind.
The Plaintiff, however, does not propose to simply award the
Plaintiff ^the speculative business assets of the estate and
exclude the Defendant from benefitting from their development.
Rather the Plaintiff proposes that this Court instruct the lower
court that equity requires that the Plaintiff be allowed the
use of the estatefs speculative business assets unencumbered
as inventory in his business of real estate development.

Such

disposition could be accompanied by a direction to the trial
court to retain jurisdiction until such time as the speculative
business assets are liquidated whether as improved or unimproved
real estate.

At the time of liquidation, the Defendant would

be entitled to invoke the retained jurisdiction of the Court
for the purpose of participating in the proceeds of the liquidated
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assets in the form of an adjusted award of alimony, the Court
at that time, taking into consideration all the circumstances
to which equity would traditionally look.
Such a disposition of the speculative business assets
of the estate has substantial virtues.

The most important is

that it would afford the best chance that the full potential
worth of these assets will be preserved for the benefit of both
parties by removing the cloud of judgment liens over such assets
and allowing their potential as collateral to be fully used.
Since the actual value of these highly speculative assets is
largely indeterminate, it allows both parties to benefit from the
ultimate value of these properties whatever that value may become.
It restores the parties more nearly to the economic status each
enjoyed prior to the dissolution of the marriage, a prime objective
of the divorce laws.
P.2d 1006 (1951).

McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236

It does so because, by the great weight of

the evidence, the Klein household as a whole, prior to the divorce,
observed a frugal standard of living in order to make the maximum
amount of funds available to assemble the business assets of the
marital estate.

(Modification Proceedings of July 1974, 1350

record at 1486, Affidavit of the Plaintiff dated November 27,
1973, 224 Record at 224, 99 Abstract at 99). The family had
foregone consumption in the present in anticipation of substantial
future rewards.

Under a plan of retained jurisdiction for the

purpose of adjustment of alimony, both parties would continue
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to forego extravagant living in the present so that the prospect
of substantial future rewards may be preserved.
The practice of retaining jurisdiction for the purpose of
using future alimony as a means of accomplishing an equitable
division of a marital estate is solidly grounded in precedent.
In Wooley v. Wooley, 113 Utah 391, 195 P.2d 743 (1948), the marital
estate consisted of a home, certain annuities and securities
and "certain speculative interests in mining ventures from which
there is a possibility of paying defendant a substantial salary
and capital gain on his investment.fl
The trial court awarded the wife a share of the proceeds
from the sale of the home and one-third of the estate's other
liquid assets, but no share of the speculative mining interests.
The wife, on appeal asserted her right to share in the speculative
assets.
The appellate court agreed that the wife had a right
to share in the benefits of the speculative assets of the estate.
But rather than undertake to divide assets of indeterminate value
and attempting to credit the recipient with having received a
certain portion of the value of marital estate, and rather than
placing the unsuccessful marital partners in the position of
future business partners by dividing the speculative assets in
kind, the Wooley court directed the trial court to retain jurisdiction
of the matter for the purpose of allowing the wife to share in
the materialized values of the speculative assets through an
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equitable adjustment of her award of alimony.

The Wooley court

went so far as to require that the trial court's original award
be modified to include an award of alimony so that a method would
be available to make future equitable adjustments in the financial
circumstances of the wife.

195 P.2d at 745.

Again, in Dahlberg v, Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214
C1930), a divorce was granted to the wife.

The marital estate

consisted of a small residential farm valued at $6,000.

The

trial court awarded the farm to the husband, giving the wife
alimony of $10 per month and a cash award of $2,000.
The wife, on appeal, asserted a right to half of the
marital property on the ground that all the marital property
had been acquired by the parties' joint efforts.
The appellate court agreed that the trial court had
erred in not finding the wife to be entitled to a larger share of
the marital property.

But rather than ordering a division of

the farm in kind, or the sale of the farm and a division of the
proceeds, the appellate court left the estate's income producing
asset intact and directed the court to double the amount of
alimony awarded the wife.
The final, and possibly greatest, advantage of a property
division which retains jurisdiction for the purpose of making
an equitable adjustment of future alimony over a division in
kind, is the psychological relief to both parties which would
accompany such a division.

In the Judgments of November 11,

and December Digitized
18, by1974,
the parties are made co-owners in one
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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form or another, of the St. George Sandpiper property, the
Sandberg, Pershing Nelson, and Seegmiller properties, virtually
all of the major assets of the marital estate. As stated in
Wetzel v. Wetzel, 35 Wis. 103, 150 N.W.2d 482 (1967), wherein
the husband appealed the award to him of a one-third interest
in the business he had founded:
In small estates, it may be that such a division is the only possible division, but when there
are sufficient assets as in the instant case, it
would seem that any form of joint control or ownership of assets by divorced persons should be avoided.
The elimination of the source of strife and friction
is to be sought and the financial affairs of the
divorced parties separate as far as possible. If
the parties cannot get along as husband and wife,
it is not likely they will'get along as partners
in business. (Emphasis added).
Avoiding such continued post marital friction with
respect to business matters was a prime concern of the court
in its original decree of divorce which awarded to the Defendant all the non-business assets of the marital estate and
retained limited jurisdiction to adjust alimony as equity might
require.
1020).

(Transcript of Proceedings on Objections, 1011 Record at

To distribute marital property to meet the need for

terminating personal friction between the parties is a practice
grounded solidly in precedent.

For example in Calderon v.

Calderon, 9 Ariz. 538, 454 P.2d 586 (1969), the business owned
by the parties was awarded to the husband.

The court stated,

at 454. P.2d at 590;
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"Moreover, even if it be assumed for the sake of
argument that a greater part of the community property
was awarded to the defendant as a result of awarding
him the business property, we would still be unable to
agree with appellantTs suggestion that the business
property be awarded to both parties as tenants-in-common....
There was ample evidence from which the trail court
could conlude that the plan of distribution suggested
by appellant would not only perpetuate the conflict
between the parties, but would also be detrimental to
the continued operation of the business."
The Plaintiff submits that the injustice to both parties
of forcing premature liquidation of this marital estate is clear,
and that there is available an alternative method of dividing
marital property, firmly sanctioned by the authorities of this
jurisdiction, which will do equity to both parties without destroying
the marital estate in the process.

The Plaintiff.requests that

this Court undertake to divide the marital property or, in the
alternative, remand this cause to the trial court with the instruction
that equity requires that the speculative assets of this marital
estate not be divided but remain with the Plaintiff, and, further,
that the trial court protect the Defendant by retaining jurisdiction
for the purpose of adjusting the alimony awarded the Defendant
at such time as these assets are liquidated by the Plaintiff.
POINT III
THE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND JUDGMENTS HERETO
RENDEREDHBT THE TRIAL COURT EXCEED THE JURISDICTION OF THAT
COURT.
In the present case, the original divorce decree
was the subject of an appeal and a motion for a new trial,
both of which were denied in Klein y. Klein, 30 Utah 2d 1, 511
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P. 2d 1284 (1973).

The Court referred in its opinion to the

limited jurisdiction retained by the trial court as a possible
avenue for relief from alleged inequities in the decree not
sufficient to support a reversal or a new trial.

That reser-

vation was quoted:
The court further retains limited jurisdiction if within one year either party proves to
be suffering serious financial distress because of the decree to be based on this decision
and the ensuing deye1opments arising therefrom
not capable of evaluation and effect at this time,
the court will review its rulings and determine
whether modifications should be made. (Emphasis
added).
It is true that the Supreme Court opinion gave a liberal
construction to the wording of the reservation.

It suggested

a possible definition of "serious financial distress" as the
inability of the Defendant to maintain her accustomed standard
of living on the alimony and support provided.

It also

suggested that the distribution of assets under the original
decree might be reexamined under the reservation.
Although the Supreme Court speculated that alimony
might be adjusted or assets redistributed within the terms of
the reservation, the Court did not dispense with the prerequisites
for doing so.

By the terms of the reservation, those prerequisites

are the allegation and proof of (1) suffering of serious
financial distress, (2) due to ensuing developments (3)
not capable of evaluation at the time of trial.

-41-
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It is crucial to note that the Order of December 7, 1973
authorized an "unrestricted" hearing of economic matters
expressly upon the reasoning that an unrestricted hearing
was necessary to ascertain whether "serious financial distress"
was in fact suffered by either party and, if so, whether the
limited jurisdiction reserved in the original decree should
then be invoked.

(Order, dated December 7, 1973, 233 Record at

236, 105 Abstract at 109). It was for the purpose of making the
determination of whether "serious financial distress" was in fact
suffered by either party and, therefore, the reservation of limit
jurisdiction should be invoked, that the Order of December 7, 197
authorized the hearings of July 23, 26 and 29, 1974.

The Order

itself clearly left both questions to be determined by those
hearings.

The interlocutory

appeal taken from that Order by

the Plaintiff, which this Court declined to hear on February
11, 1974, therefore, in no way disposed of the issue of jurisdiction in this matter.
On October 24, 1973, the Defendant filed a Petition for
Review of Economic Matters, together with an Affidavit of the
Defendant dated November 8, 1973 to invoke the limited jurisdiction reserved in the original divorce decree.

The Affidavit

alleged that she was suffering hardship in so far as the parties
pre-divorce level of consumption spending had been from $25,000
to $30,000 per year, that her present income was $18,000 per
year.

(213 Record at 213, 87 Abstract at 88).
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The Plaintiff filed a counteraffidavit, dated November
27, 1974, showing his income tax returns for the previous four
years which disclosed an average annual unadjusted gross income
of approximately $22,000.

It alleged that the Plaintiff had

verified the expenses claimed in the Defendant's Affidavit by
securing statements from the Defendant's creditors showing many
of the expenses listed in the Defendant's Affidavit to be overstated from 2001 to 300%. (224 Record at 224-25, 99 Abstract at
99-101.)

Said income tax returns and creditor statements were

received in evidence during the subsequent modification hearings
and went unrebutted by the Defendant.

In addition, the testimony

of the Plaintiff that the Klein household had lived on a monthly
disposable income including house payments of $700 per month
went unrebutted at those hearings.
The unrebutted evidence in this case is, therefore,
that the present disposable income of the Defendant is at least
twice the amount available to her before the original divorce
decree.

The only evidence offered by the Defendant to support

a finding of nserious financial distress'1 is her testimony during
the modification hearings, that her expenses exceeded her income
since the original decree.

Similarly, the only finding of "serious

financial distress11 offered by the trial court was the mere
conclusion that the Defendant had suffered such distress.

In

response to the Plaintiff's objection, the trial court offered
to remedy the defectiveness of such finding by including figures
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demonstrating that the Defendant's expenses had exceeded her
income.

(Proceedings of December 6, at page 17, 357 Abstract

at 358).
The Plaintiff submits that in light of the unrebutted
evidence which shows the Defendant's present disposable income
to be double its pre-divorce level, the mere fact that she has
managed to squander even that income cannot, by any fair reading
of the terms of the jurisdiction reserved in the original decree,
be interpreted to constitute "serious financial distress" brought
about by that decree and cannot serve as a basis for invoking the
jurisdiction reserved in the original decree.
Regardless of whether the trial court's finding with respect to the Defendant's "serious financial distress" is sustained
or rejected, the second and third prerequisites to invoking the
limited jurisdiction reserved by the original decree remain unsatisfied
Such "serious financial distress" as would justify invoking the
reserved jurisdiction must arise from "ensuing developments",
"not capable of evaluation at the time of trial."

The function

of the reservation, by its terms, is limited to functions that
the trial itself could not perform, to issues that the trial
process could not properly dispose of.

Issues that clearly fall

into the latter category are the equity or inequity of the division
of property in the original decree and the value of the speculative assets which were in the form of options and of contingent
value at the time of the decree.

These are the issues which
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were subject to uncertainty at the time of the original trial
and the issues about which the trial court expressed uncertainty
when discussing its reservation of jurisdiction,

(Hearings On

Objections, 986 Record 1011, 53 Abstract at 56). But the issues
of the value of the non-speculative assets of the estate, such as
the Major Enterprises stock, the Sandpiper apartment complexes
and contiguous lands held by Major Enterprises and O.K. Enterprises,
clearly are subject to no such uncertainty.

Whether or not their

ultimate disposition is considered to be an issue within the
scope of the reservation, their value clearly is not.

Their

value was fully litigated by both sides, those values have not
changed significantly since they were first litigated and determined
at the original trial.

There have been no "ensuing developments"

affecting those values and those non-speculative assets have
no attributes which could be said to make them "not capable of
evaluation at the time of trial".

The Plaintiff, therefore,

submits that issue of the value as distinct from the disposition
of the non-speculative assets of the marital estate can not satisfy
the second and third jurisdictional prerequisites imposed by
the trial court.

The Plaintiff requests that this Court accompany

the remand of this case with the instruction that the issue of
the value of the non-speculative assets of the marital estate,
such as those held by Major Enterprises and O.K. Enterprises,
and Major Enterprises1 stock, be excluded from the trial courtfs
deliberations.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

/

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EXCLUDE CERTAIN
ASSETS FROM THE MARITAL ESTATE.
It is the undisputed rule in this* and virtually all
jurisdictions, that for purposes of the division of property
in proceedings of divorce, the marital estate consists of those
assets acquired through the joint efforts of the parties.

Pinion

v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937), a leading case establishing the factors to be considered in making an equitable
division of marital property states at 67 P.2d 267-68:
If she (the defendant) had helped to accumulate part of his fortune, she would ordinarily be entitled
to a substantial portion, at least of that which she
aided in accumulating, depending upon all the circumstances attending the accumulation.
In

McDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 (1951), the

husband was granted a divorce from his alcoholic wife.

i
|
I
'

Assets

that were accumulated entirely during the marriage were characterized as having been acquired

ff

entirely through (the husband's)

efforts and salary, except $300 of hers which went into the

|
i

original house equity and the $6,900 from her inheritance.ff
In Joiner v. Joiner, 131 Tex. 27, 112 S.W.2d 1049 (1938),

I

the husband moved to a new city for business reasons and the
wife refused to follow, preferring to remain in the community

|

where she had put down her social roots.

i

During the period of

amicable separation, the husband discovered oil on his oil
leases "through his persistent, tireless and almost heroic
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fortitude11 without which "these leases would never have been
any substantial value to him.M
The wife, on appeal, asserted a right to share in half
of the value of the leases on the grounds that they were accumulated with her "joint efforts".

The court held, at 112 S.W.2d

1053, that the wife;
...did not by her labor, industry, skill, ability
or earnings contribute anything to their acquisition...
nor did she contribute anything to the domestic life
of defendant while acquiring the original purchase
money....
and therefore had no interest whatever in said properties.
The Plaintiff, in the present case, has been separated
from the Defendant since July, 1971.

Since that time he

has borrowed in excess of $98,080, including $16,750 from the
modest savings of his aged mother.

(Affidavit of Edna H. Roghaar,

dated January 16, 1975, 462 Record at 462, 434 Abstract at
434) to apply as purchase money on the Sandberg, Pershing Nelson
and Seegmiller properties.

With reference to the Seegmiller

property in particular, this property existed within the Plaintiff's
estate as an option due to expire on May 31, 1972. The Defendant
was asked to co-sign the note and mortgage necessary to raise
the $37,000 necessary to exercise the option.
refused.

The Defendant

On May 18, 1972, a Memorandum Decision of Divorce

was entered approving a proposed division of property in which
the Seegmiller option would be retained by the Plaintiff.

On

May 25, 1972, the Plaintiff borrowed the necessary money to
exercise the option.

As in Joiner, the Plaintiff raised the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

purchase money during a period when the Plaintiff received no
contribution, either domestic or economic, from the Defendant.
He obligated himself at considerable personal risk in order
to exercise the Seegmiller option in reliance upon the Memorandum
Decision of the court.

The Defendant, after having refused

to share in the risk of acquiring the Seegmiller property, will
participate fully in the benefits of the Plaintiff's efforts,
having been awarded under the modifying Judgments heretofore entered
by the trial court, the beneficial interest in the Seegmiller
property but none of the risks or debts.

The Plaintiff submits

that a proper application of the "joint efforts'1 doctrine and
general equitable principles require that the trial court be
instructed, upon remand, to exclude all or part of the Seegmiller
property from the divisible marital estate,
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN VALUING THE ASSETS OF THE MARITAL
ESTATE AS OF THE DATE OF THE MODIFICATION HEARINGS,
The rule is well settled that the value of the property
to be divided must be taken as of a date as near as possible to
the date of dissolution of the marital community.

Randolph v.

Randolph, 118 Cal. 2d 584, 258 P.2d 547 (1953); Dunlap v. Dunlap,
212 P.608, (Okl) (1923); Miller v. Miller, 157 N.W.2d 537
S.D. (1968),

The rule is summarized in 27B C.J.S. MDivorce and

Separation" Section 295.
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In the instant case, the Defendant has, in her own
Affidavit and Motion of November 12, 1972, upon which the Order
authorizing modification hearings is based, framed the issue of
valuation to be the value of the marital estate at the time of
the divorce decree.

The trial court itself declared that the

Defendant has so framed the issues and should be bound thereby.
(Transcript of Modification Hearings, 1023 Record at 1077, 112
Abstract at 133), Subsequently, after conferring with counsel
in chambers, the trial court ruled that values would be taken
as of the date of the hearing.

The Plaintiff submits that such

ruling is in direct conflict with the established rule governing
valuation dates in matters of divorce and requests that this
Court disregard evidence taken in conflict with the rule.

Such

error has greatly prejudiced the Plaintiff in that the Seegmiller
property was merely an option on May 18, 1972 when the Memorandum
Decision of divorce approving the original division of property
was rendered.

The Memorandum Decision containing all of the

requisite elements of a judgment under Rule 54, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure should be considered the relevant valuation
date.

See United States v. F. $ M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356

U.S. 227, (1958) holding that intent controls the question of
what constitutes a judgment.

In addition, equity demands that

the parties be entitled to rely on such an order in all subsequent
transactions.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS VALUATION OF CERTAIN MARITAL
ASSETS ON ERRORS OF FACT AND OF LAW.
The valuation of the marital estate at $1,800,000 is
eight times the value placed upon it by the original Judgment
of November, 1972 and six times greater than the value ever
placed upon it as collateral by a lending institution.

(Affidavit

of Glen Saxton dated January 17, 1975, 465 Record at 466-67,
436 Abstract at 436-38.)

The values arrived at merely recite

those asserted by the Defendant despite the tremendous discrepancy
in the evidence of value taken.

See table supra, at page 23.

Such spectacular upward revaluations are entirely inconsistent
with the values arrived at by prior judgments with those ascribed
to the marital estate by the business community, yet entirely
consistent with the values asserted by the Defendant.

They were

arrived at in total disregard of patent errors of fact of which
the trial court was notified by the Plaintiff.

These facts strongly

suggest that the Plaintiff did not receive the independent
judgment of the court with respect to the value of the marital
property which is the fundamental entitlement of the Plaintiff.
With respect to the Plaintiff's contract receivable
from Holidair Lands, Inc., a real estate holding company, the
contract amount of $504,000 receivable by the Plaintiff is not
receivable by the Plaintiff until January 31, 1986.

The unpaid

balance due under the contract bears interest at 1-1/2% for
the year 1972, and 8-1/2% for the year ending January, 1986,
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with the interest rate increasing by 1/2% each intervening year,
all of which appears on the face of the contract which was
received in evidence.

It is patently clear that the present

value of the contract must, therefore, be discounted to reflect
the difference between the contract interest rate and the market
interest rate for contracts receivable.

Assuming a then current

prime rate of 91, the discounted value of the contract is $328,800
rather than $504,000 as found by the trial court.

Assuming

a then current competitive interest rate on the contract receivable
market of 18%, the present value of the Plaintiff's contract
is $133,100.00.

In failing to discount the Plaintiff's contract

receivable, the error of the trial court is patent and beyond
dispute and a new trial of this matter is required.
With respect to the value of the Plaintiff's stock in
Major Enterprises, the trial court valued that at $543,399.05,
a value identical to that found by the court for the apartments
and unimproved land held by Major Enterprises.

The trial court

equated the value of the corporation's stock with its underlying
assets despite the following evidence before it.
1)

Plaintiff's stock constituted 50% of the

stock of Major Enterprises, a closely held corporation;
2)

Such stock was subject to a right of first

refusal held by Verl O'Brien, the owner of the remaining
shares of Major Enterprises;
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3)

The Defendant, acknowledged that Mr. O'Brien

was the only potential buyer of the Plaintiff's shares.
(Page 19 of the Hearings and Objections of December 6,
and 9, 1974);
4)

The assets of Major Enterprises were encum-

bered from $250,000 to $400,000 in excess of their value
as collateral.

(Testimony of Verl O'Brien, 1568, Record

at 1568-72);
5)

Mr. O'Brien, the only potential buyer of the

Plaintiff's stock, has no uncommitted liquid assets with
which to purchase the Plaintiff's shares.
The trial court equated the market value of the Plaintiff's
stock with the value of its underlying assets.

(Hearings on Objec-

tions, dated December 6 and 9, 1974, at page 17).

It did so

in total disregard of conclusive evidence that the Plaintiff's
stock carried with it no power to liquidate the corporate assets,
and that his stock was virtually unmarketable.
By the great weight of authority, the fair market value
of stock cannot be based on net asset value alone where that
stock represents a minority interest with no power to force a
liquidation of the corporate assets.

In Whitman v. Whitman,

34 Wis.2d 341, 149 N.W.2d 529, 532, the court held that

M

where

a minority stockholder is in no position to force a liquidation,
a determination of fair market value cannot be based on liquidating
values.'1

Even a majority interest cannot always be valued
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according to net asset value alone, due to the difficulties
inherent in liquidating the corporation or finding a buyer
interested in all of the corporate assets.
Maxcy, 28 T.C.M. 783 (1969).

Estate of Gregg

In each of the following cases,

the valuation of stock based solely on the liquidation value
of the assets.has been held reversible error.

Estate of Gooding,

269 Wis., 69 N.W.2d 586 (1965); Irene de Guebriant, 14 T.C.
611 (.1950), rev, on other grounds 185 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1951);
Lillian M. Schroeder, 13 T.C. 259 (1949); Charles W. Heppenstall,
P-H Memo. T.C. 49,034; Elizabeth A. Wilson, P-H Memo. T.C.
51,247; Wittemore v. Fitzpatrick, 127 F. Supp. 757 (D.C. Conn.
1957); Paulina DuPont Dean, P-H Memo. T.C. 1960-54; Worthen
v. United States, 192 F. Supp. 727 (D. Mass. 1961).
The cases are unanimous in holding that the existence
of a right of first refusal to buy stock at a stated price,
such as that contained in exhibit 38-P governing the Plaintiff's
Major Enterprises stock, serves to depress the market value
of that stock.

Worcester County Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 134 F.2d

578 (1st Cir. 1943).

In accord are the following cases involving

the federal estate tax. A. Fry, 9 T.C. 503 (1947); F. A. Koch,
28B.T.A. 363 (1933); Louise N. Schulz. 14 B.T.A. 419 (1928);
L.E. Coutler, 7 T.C. 1280 (1946); Michigan Trust Co. 27 B.T.A.
556 (1933); City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 23 B.T.A. 663 (1931);
Eugene Kelley, P-H Memo TC 55,129; Isaac Baldwin, P-H Memo TC
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1959-203; Matthews v, United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D.N.Y.
1964); Estate of P. G, Reynolds, 55 T.C. 172 (1970).
The financial condition of a corporation and its capacity
to pay dividends is likewise held to be an important factor
in determining the value of closely held stock,
States, 173 F.2d 833 CS.D. 111., N.D. 1959),

Bader v. United

Therefore, the trial

court was legally obligated to consider the effect of the encumbrance
of the assets of Major Enterprises of at least $250,000 in excess
of their value.
The Plaintiff submits that by valuing his stock in Major
Enterprises according to the liquidation value of its assets
alone, the trial court has committed reversible error, requiring
a new trial of this matter.
With respect to the amount of $504,000 which the court
found Holidair Lands, Inc. obligated to pay the Plaintiff under
a contract receivable, the Plaintiff testified (1350 Record at 1479),
that the contract had been rescinded by the obligor and obligee
by their mutual consent based upon a mutual mistake of fact
as to the nature of the obligor's consideration received and
a new modified contract had been agreed to which reduced the
obligation of Holidair Lands to the Plaintiff from $504,000
to $390,000.

When the court expressed its confusion over the

nature of this rescission and modification and the Plaintiff,
in light of this confusion, moved for the taking of additional
testimony, such motion was denied by the trial court.
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(Hearings

on Objections dated December 6 and 9, 1974 at page 40). The
Plaintiff submits that in light of such uncertainty on the part
of the trial court, and the proffer of proof made by the Plaintiff,
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow
additional testimony to be taken in this matter.
The Seegmiller property is a 1181 acre tract of arid,
sagebrush covered desert on top of a mesa several miles from
St. George.

The validity of any appraised value of such property

depends almost entirely upon the assumptions that are made about
the availability of water.

In this regard the testimony of

the Defendant's expert appraiser is fatally defective and,
therefore, the acceptance of that appraised value by the trial
court is fatally defective as well.
The Defendant's appraiser, Mr. Gus Johns, assumed that
water was available to the Seegmiller property sufficient to
develop the entire tract in ascribing a value of $352 per acre
to it (1200 Record at 1291, 112 Abstract at 164). He conceded
he made no direct investigation of the availability of water,
the amount available, or the cost of obtaining it.

(1200 Record

at 1291, 112 Abstract at 164). The Court itself ruled that
Mr. Johns was not qualified to give an expert opinion as to
the availability of water to the Seegmiller property.
Record at 1275).

(1200

Mr. Johns arrived at the $352 per acre value

for the Seegmiller property by equating it to the Dixie Springs
property, a 2,000 acre tract with 9.2 second feet of proven
well water, and which sold for $370 per acre.

From that, Mr.
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Johns substracted an arbitrarily chosen figure of $18 per acre
as the cost of placing water upon the Seegmiller property and
concluded that the Seegmiller property was worth $352 per acre.
Mr, Johns had earlier testified that the cost of drilling prospecting
wells would be $60,000, which on a per acre basis is roughly
triple the $18 per acre figure asserted elsewhere.
On the other hand, the Plaintiff, as the owner, gave expert
testimony that water was not available other than by prospecting
for it by drilling and that he had been refused a drilling permit
by the State Engineer.

(1350 Record at 1461-62).

The state of the record in this case, therefore, shows
the testimony of Mr. Johns, inconsistent, based on hearsay and
ruled incompetent by the court, that water was available to
the Seegmiller property versus the competent testimony of the
Plaintiff's direct knowledge that the availability of water
to Seegmiller could not be determined without drilling and that
permission to drill had been denied.

The Plaintiff submits

that the appraisal of the Seegmiller property was based upon
the critical assumption of the availability of water, that that
fact was not in evidence and that, therefore, the appraisal
of the Plaintiff must be accepted by the trial court as the
only competent evidence in the record as to the value of the
Seegmiller property.

-56-
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POINT VII
THE JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1974, IF UPHELD BY
THIS COURT, WILL MAKE LAWSUITS BY THIRD PARTIES NECESSARY TO
PROTECT THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS;
The Judgments of November 11 and of December 18, 1974,
entered by the trial court impose a $600 per acre security
interest in favor of the Defendant in the installment land purchase contracts to the Pershing Nelson and Sandberg properties
which rights are the property of Holidair Lands, Inc.

They impose,

as well, a lien in favor of the Defendant of $600 per acre upon
the Pershing Nelson and Sandberg properties, title to which is
held by Holidair Lands, Inc.

(Judgment of November 11, 1974,

338 Record at 405, 328 Abstract at 333-34).
Richard Rogers is the holder of 17-1/2% of the outstanding shares of Holidair Lands.

The above-described Judgments

clearly impose a security interest and a lien upon the interests
of Richard Rogers, as a minority stockholder, in the assets of
Holidair Lands, Inc.
Similarly, there exists in Verl O'Brien, a holder of
50% of the shares of Major Enterprises, an option to buy the
stock held by the Plaintiff in Major Enterprises at a predetermined price, payable according to an established schedule.

The

Judgments of November 11, and December 18, 1974 entered by the
trial court, require the stock of the Plaintiff which is subject
to the option rights of Verl O'Brien, to be pledged to the court
as security and sold upon the default of certain obligations
imposed upon the Plaintiff by those Judgments.
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The law is undisputed that a court may not enter any
decree of divorce affecting the interests of third persons not
made a party to the divorce action.

Emery v. Emery, 122 Mont.

201, 200 P.2d 251 (1948); Greco v. Foster; 268 P.2d 215 (Okl. 1954);
Potter v. Potter, 35 Wash. 2d 788, 215 P.2d 704 (1950).
The Plaintiff submits that the third party interests burdened by the aforementioned Judgments of the trial court render
those Judgments contrary to law and require a new trial of this
matter.
CONCLUSION
The alleged stipulation by the Plaintiff to the Judgment
of December 18, 1974 dividing the marital assets is null and void.
The incapacity of the Plaintiff under the circumstances to contract
is demonstrated by the record and sufficient to rescind an ordinary
contract in equity, a higher standard than applies to stipulations
in matters of divorce.

The entry of a consent judgment by the trial

court subsequent to the withdrawal of the Plaintiff's consent
constitutes an irregularity of the court under the strong majority
rule of Van Donselaar v. Van Donselaar and is grounds for a new
trial of this matter.
Though there is no extant judgment in this action, the
hardship that would otherwise result to both parties requires
review at this time of the unambiguous position heretofore taken
by the trial court is manifest.

It imposes financial obligations

upon the Plaintiff far greater than his income, encumbers the
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business assets of the estate so as to nullify their value as
collateral, and thereby forces the liquidation of the estate at
a fraction of its potential worth.

This manifest inequity to

both parties could be avoided by dividing the marital estate so as
to leave its speculative business assets to the Plaintiff to be
developed, and protecting the right of the Defendant to benefit
therefrom by retaining jurisdiction to be invoked for the purpose
of making an equitable adjustment of the alimony awarded the Defendant at such time as those assets are liquidated.
Respectfully submitted,
HATCH $ PLUMB

B

7 C h^ks^s/J
^ ' Orrin G.^H/tilh

i
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APPENDIX A-l
MODIFIED ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO
DEFENDANT, SET FORTH AT PARAGRAPHS 2-7 OF JUDGMENT DATED NOVEMBER
11, 1974:
(A)

Alimony per month

(B)

Child support for three children .
per month

300.00

Mortgage, tax and insurance payments
on residence per month

350.00

(C)

$

300.00

(D)

All medical expenses of minor children

Unvalued

(E)

Beneficial interest in certain life
insurance policies

Unvalued

(F)

Attorney's fees

4,250.00

(G)

Liquidated stock

7,000.00

(H)

Home of parties, Plaintiff to assume
the $30,000 mortgage, taxes and
insurance premiums1

(I)
(J)

(K)

(L)

Membership in Willow Creek Country
Club

103,000.00
2,580.00

Undivided one-half interest in
St. George Sandpiper Apartments and
6.2 acres of contiguous raw land, net
of mortgage
Seegmiller property, consisting of
1181,.56 acres. Plaintiff to pay
mortgage of $72,507 within three (3)
years, such payment to be secured by
pledging Plaintiff1s stock in Major
Enterprises to be sold upon default
of mortgage obligation

416,064.00

Undivided one-half interest in a contract payable by Holidair Lands, Inc.
to Plaintiff. Such interest secured
by a lien of $600 per acre on Pershing
Nelson and Sandberg properties owned by
Holidair Lands, Inc.

252,000.00

TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED DEFENDANT

68,500.00

842,144.00

Monthly mortgage, tax and insurance payments reflected in Item C.
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APPENDIX A-2
MODIFIED OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY THE DEFENDANT, SET FORTH
AT PARAGRAPH 9, JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 11, 1974:
(A)

(B)

(C)

The short and long-term debts on
the Sandpiper Apartments in St. George
and contiguous acreage
Note payable to Dynamic Corporation
for Willow Creek Country Club Membership

$73,000.00

1,920.00

The miscellaneous outstanding bills
and debts of the Defendant as of
July 28, 1974, as follows:
Castleton's
J. C. Penney Company
Bud's Hardware
Sprinklers
Kimrey's
Makoff
Utah Spraying
Morley Sprague
Goodyear Tire Company
Beehive Insurance
Owen's (Boys' Shoes)
Wally Sandack
Homer Smith
LDS Hospital
Salt Lake Water Conservancy
District
Salt Lake Clinic
Mountain Fuel Supply Cc>mpany
Engh Floral
Willow Creek Country Club
Great Garb
Jak's
Cottonwood Sanitary Disstrict
MONY (Insurance Policy for
Douglas)
Dee Call
Zinik's
Chesley Drug
Glover Nursery
Wolfe's
Bullock's
Winder Dairy
Dr. Holbrook
Costs of litigation, including
initial appraisal expenses
and depositions

402.72
85.24
46.52
22,64
87.19
169.88
44.00
35.00
357.65
172.00
71.56
30.00
20.00
6.45
17.38
16.52
60.39
31.82
337.06
174.42
41.44
19.35
30.04
10.00
60.24
5.90
106.09
103.50
3.36
59.75
15.00
1,073.76
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Valley Bank § Trust Company
2,573.97
Mrs. C. W. Pressler
4,000.00
Imperial Realty
253.98
Automobile Repairs not covered
by insurance
70.02
Due to Marcellus Palmer for
Appraisal
350.00
Due to Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss
Campbell § Cowley, attorney's
fees and costs
11,000.00
Due Augustus Johns for
Appraisal
1,971.81
Total
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY
DEFENDANT

$ 98,856.65

TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO DEFENDANT

$842,144.00

LESS ALLOCATED DEBTS
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO
DEFENDANT, NET OF ALLOCATED DEBT
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$ 23,936.65

98,856.65
$743,287.35

APPENDIX A-3
MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, PARAGRAPH 8, JUDGMENT
OF NOVEMBER 11, 1974:
(A)

Stock in Major Enterprises (subject
to the security interest of the
Defendant

$

543,399.05

(B)

Stock in Holidair Lands, Inc.

196,762.50

(C)

Undivided one-half interest in contract
payable by Holidair Lands

252,000.00

(D)

Stock in Award Homes, Inc.

(E)

Stock in Dynamic Corporation

(F)

Plaintiff's profit sharing trust

47,850.00

(G)

Contract receivable from Harmon Johnson

17,546.67

Total Assets Awarded the Plaintiff
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59,369.86
4,543.55

$1,121,471.63

/

APPENDIX A-4
MODIFIED OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY PLAINTIFF, PARAGRAPH 10,
JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 11, 1974:
All debts and obligations incurr-ed during the marriage not
allocated to the Defendant, specifically including, but not necessaril>
limited to, the following, to be paid and discharged by the Plaintiff
Notes payable to Valley Bank § Trust Company
- secured by a mortgage on the Seegmiller
Land
Note payable, secured by a mortgage on Salt
Lake City residence
Note payable to Mary Warren, with accrued
interest
Note payable to American Equity
"
Notes payable to Major Enterprises
Note payable to Carl Ohran
Account payable to Bowles
Current legal fees payable re Sandberg
litigation
Note payable to O.K. Enterprises
Fees payable to Harley W. Gustin, Esq.
Fees payable to James R. Brown, Esq.
Other miscellaneous payables
Allowance for additional attorney's fees for
Plaintiff,
and for other
TOTALthe
DEBTS
AND OBLIGATIONS
TO BEmiscellaneous
DISCHARGED
debts
of
the
Plaintiff
upon
which
there is
B
V
T
U
B
DT
A
T
M
T
T
C
C
BY THE PLAINTIFF
no testimony
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$ 72,507.00
29,400.00
18,700.00
5,600.00
25,562.00
5,900.00
1,000.00
1,200.00
2,250.00
4,250.00
7,000.00
1,500.00

i

$189,869.00 I
—

•

15,000.00

I
I
I
I

In addition to the foregoing, the Plaintiff was ordered
and directed to pay and discharge all business obligations
incurred by him and/or Defendant (excluding those which the
Defendant was specifically ordered and directed to discharge),
either directly or indirectly or through their guarantee of
corporate obligations, and to save and hold Defendant harmless
therefrom.
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY PLAINTIFF

$

TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF

$1,121,471.63

LESS ALLOCATED DEBTS

189,869.00

5

TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF,
NET OF ALLOCATED DEBT
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189,869,00

$

931,602.63

APPENDIX A-5
MODIFIED ALIMONY, CHILD SUPPORT AND MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO
DEFENDANT, SET FORTH AT PARAGRAPHS 1-5 OF JUDGMENT DATED DECEMBER
18, 1974:
(A)

Alimony per month

(B)

Child support for three children
per month

300.00

Mortgage, tax and insurance payments
on residence per month

350.00

(C)

$

300.00

(D)

All medical expenses of minor children

Unvalued

(E)

Beneficial interest in certain life
insurance policies

Unvalued

(F)

Attorneys fees

4,250.00

(G)

Liquidated stock

7,000.00

(H)

Home of parties, Plaintiff to assume
the $30,000 mortgage, taxes and
insurance premiums-*-

(I)
(J)

Membership in Willow Creek Country
Club
St. George Sandpiper Apartments in fee
simple, net of mortgage

103,000.00
3,500.0-0
33,000.00

(K)

Undivided one-half interest in
Seegmiller property, consisting of
1181.56 acres. Plaintiff to divide the
property into two parcels, Defendant to
select either resulting parcel at her
election. Plaintiff to pay
mortgage of $72,507 within three (3)
years, such payment to be secured by
pledging Plaintiff1s stock in Major
Enterprises to be sold upon default
of mortgageone-half
obligation
208,000.00
(L)
Undivided
interest in a contract payable by Holidair Lands, Inc.
to Plaintiff, Sucli interest secured
•
by a lien of $600 per acre on Pershing
Nelson and Sandberg properties owned by
Holidair Lands, Inc.
252,000.00
Monthly mortgage,
insurance
payments
reflected
in Item C
Digitized by thetax
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i

(M)

Defendant to receive from Plaintiff
$50,000 in payments of $5,000, commencing
April 1, 1975 and ending April 1, 1983.
Such payment to be secured by pledging
Plaintiff's stock in Major Enterprises
to be sold upon Plaintiff's default
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED DEFENDANT
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50,000.00
$649,500.00

APPENDIX A-6
MODIFIED OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY THE DEFENDANT, SET FORTH
AT PARAGRAPHS 9-10, JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1974:
(A)

(B)

The long-term debts only secured by
the Sandpiper Apartments in St. George
and contiguous acreage
The miscellaneous outstanding bills
and debts of the Defendant as of
July 28, 1974, as follows:
Castleton's
402 72
85 24
J. C. Penney Company
46 52
Bud's Hardware
22,64
Sprinklers
87.19
Kimrey's
169, 88
Makoff
44, 00
Utah Spraying
35, 00
357,
65
Morley Sprague
172,
00
Goodyear Tire Company
71. .56
Owen's
Shoes)
Beehive (Boys'
Insurance
30, 00
Wally Sandack
20.
00
Homer Smith
6.45
LDS Hospital
Salt Lake Water Conservancy
17. 38
District
16. 52
Salt Lake Clinic
60. 39
Mountain Fuel Supply Company
82
31, 06
Engh Floral
337, 42
Willow Creek Country Club
174, 44
Great Garb
41, 35
Jak's
19,
Cottonwood Sanitary District
MONY (Insurance Policy for
30, 04
Douglas)
10. 00
Dee Call
60, 24
Zinik's
90
5, 09
Chesley Drug
106, 50
Glover Nursery
Wolfe's
103, 36
Bullock's
3, 75
Winder Dairy
59, 00
Dr. Holbrook
15
Costs of litigation, including
initial appraisal expenses 1,073.76
and depositions
2,573.97
Valley Bank § Trust Company
4,000.00
Mrs. C. W. Pressler
253.98
Imperial
Realty
Digitized by the Howard
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AutomobileMachine-generated
Repairs OCR,
not
covered
by insurance

$73,000.00

Due to Marcellus Palmer for
Appraisal
350.00
Due to Pugsley, Hayes, Watkiss
Campbell § Cowley, attorney's
fees and costs
11,000.00
Due Augustus Johns for
Appraisal
1,971.81
Total
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY
DEFENDANT
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO DEFENDANT

$
$
$

LESS ALLOCATED DEBTS
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO
DEFENDANT, NET OF ALLOCATED DEBT
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APPENDIX A-7
MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF, PARAGRAPHS 6-8, JUDGMENT
OF DECEMBER 18, 19 74:
(A)

Stock in Major Enterprises (subject
to the security interest of the
Defendant

$

543,399.05

(B)

Stock in Holidair Lands, Inc.

196,762.50

(C)

Undivided one-half interest in contract
payable by Holidair Lands

252,000.00

(D)

Stock in Award Homes, Inc.

(E)

Stock in Dynamic Corporation

(F)

Plaintiff's profit sharing trust

47,850.00

(G)

Contract receivable from Harmon Johnson

17,546.67

(H)

Undivided one-half interest in
Seegmiller property, consisting of
1181.56 acres. Plaintiff to divide the
property into two parcels. Defendant to
select either resulting parcel at her
election. Plaintiff to pay mortgage of
$72,507 within three years, such payments to be secured by pledging Plaintifffs
stock in Major Enterprises to be sold
upon default of mortgage obligation

(I)

6.2 acres of raw land contiguous to
St. George Sandpiper apartments
Total Assets Awarded the Plaintiff

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

59,369.86
.

4,543.55

208,064.00
60,000.00
$1,389.535.63

APPENDIX A-8
MODIFIED OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY PLAINTIFF, PARAGRAPH 11,
JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 19 74:
All debts and obligations incurred during the marriage not
allocated to the Defendant, specifically including, but not necessarily
limited to, the following, to be paid and dischraged by the Plaintiff:
Notes payable to Valley Bank § Trust Company
secured by a mortgage on the Seegmiller
Land
$ 72,507.00
Note payable, secured by a mortgage on Salt
Lake City residence
29,400.00
Note payable to Mary Warren, with accrued
interest
18,700.00
Note payable to American Equity
5,600.00
Notes payable to Major Enterprises
25,562.00
Note payable to Carl Ohran
5,900.00
Account payable to Bowles
1,000.00
Current legal fees payable re Sandberg
litigation
1,200.00
Note payable to O.K. Enterprises
2,250.00
Fees payable to Harley W, Gustin, Esq.
4,250.00
Fees payable to James Pv. Brown, Esq.
7,000.00
Other miscellaneous payables
1,500.00
Allowance for additional attorney's fees for
the Plaintiff, and for other miscellaneous
debts of the Plaintiff upon which there is
no testimony
15,000.00
Short term debt on St. George Sandpiper
apartments
not calculated
TOTAL
DEBTS AND
OBLIGATIONS
TO the
BE DISCHARGED
In addition
to the
foregoing,
Plaintiff was ordered
and directedBYtoTHE
payPLAINTIFF
and discharge all business obligations $189,869.00
incurred by him and/or Defendant (excluding those which the
Defendant was specifically ordered and directed to discharge),
either directly or indirectly or through their guarantee of
corporate obligations, and to save and hold Defendant harmless
therefrom.
TOTAL OBLIGATIONS TO BE DISCHARGED BY PLAINTIFF

$

TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF

$1,389,535.63
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189,869.00

LESS ALLOCATED DEBTS
TOTAL MARITAL PROPERTY AWARDED TO PLAINTIFF,
NET OF ALLOCATED DEBT
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189,869.00
$1,199,666.63

APPENDIX B-l
MONTHLY INCOME OF THE DEFENDANT AS SET FORTH IN DEFENDANTS AFFIDAVIT
DATED NOVEMBER 8, 1973 (213 Record at 213, 87 Abstract at 88):
(A)

Gross alimony and child support

.$

600.00

(B) Monthly earnings as real estate agent

500.00

(C) House payments received from Plaintiff

358.00

(D) Willow Creek Country Club dues
(E)

47.00

Insurance and medical expenses received
from Plaintiff

-i
140.00
$1,645.00

MONTHLY INCOME OF THE PLAINTIFF AS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM
(357 Record at 372, 218 Abstract at 239) AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTIONS C417 Record at 418, 343 Abstract at 345):

(A) .Salary from Major Enterprises,
Inc.
(B)

Salary from Award Homes, Inc.

(C)

Salary from Dynamic Corp.

Gross Amount

Net Amount
After taxes

$1,800.00

$1,256.46

125.00

117.00

90.00

65.28

$2,015.00

$1,436.74

lAmount listed as unknown in Defendant's Affidavit. Amount of $140.00
therefore, supplied from Plaintiff's Memorandum (357 Record at
372, 218 Abstract at 239).
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APPENDIX B-2

MONTHLY EXPENSES OF THE PLAINTIFF AS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT
IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIONS (417 Record at 418, 343 Abstract at 345):
(A) Alimony and child support

$

600.00

(B) Mortgage on home with taxes and
insurance

358.00

(C) Medical expenses Con children)

100.00

(D)

(E)

Interest on loan Oith no application to principal and excluding land purchase obligations)
Life insurance premiums

955.06
40.00
$2,053.06!

To Plaintiff's total monthly expenses should be added $300 for the
living expenses of the Plaintiff and his present wife. The
monthly expenses imposed upon the Plaintiff by the divisions
of property heretofore made by the trial court, therefore,
exceed the Plaintiff's monthly gross income by $338.05 and the
Plaintiff's monthly income net of taxes by $916.32.
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APPENDIX B-3

PRINCIPAL INDEBTEDNESS OF THE PLAINTIFF TOGETHER WITH MATURITY DATES
AS SET FORTH IN PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM (357 Record at 372, 218
Abstract at 240) ALL OF WHICH REMAIN OUTSTANDING AS OF JULY, 1975:

Harley Gustin

DUE

AMOUNT

OBLIGATION

4,250.00

Judgment, past due

Carl Ohran

5,900.00

Past due, threatened suit

Mary Warren

9,800.00

April 10, 1973

Major (on purchase of
6.2 acres)

6,500.00

June, 1973

Mary Warren

9,800.00

April 10, 1974

0 K Enterprises

2,250.00

July 30, 1974

72,507.00

August 1, 1974

Major

3,500.00

August 31, 1974

Ma j or

10,428.00

September 1, 1974

Maj or

10,512.00

January 1, 1975

Nelson Contract

10,000.00:

January 14, 1975

American Equity

5,300.00

Valley Bank

Sandberg payment

$

71,000.00

June 12, 1976
All past due but
dependent upon litigation

$221,747.00

Although this installment payment has since been discharged by the
Plaintiff, he did so by borrowing $10,000 from his mother,
Mrs. Edna Roghaar and from Richard Rogers. Therefore, the
Plaintiff's total indebtedness remains unchanged from that
shown above.
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